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PRISONERS No MORE: STATE INVESTMENT RELOCATION INCENTIVES
AN THE PRISoNERS' DILEMMA
Daniel P. Petrov*
INTRODUCTION
It is a central concern of governments to improve the economic
climate of their territory. This is true for states of all sizes, from nations to
local townships. Central to their economic success is a strong base of
commercial and industrial investment. States use a number of methods to
attract investment, such as improving public services, proximity to markets
and raw materials, and the quality of labor.1 Increasingly, states are relying
on a controversial method to attract investment: investment relocation
incentives.2 While the majority of the evidence shows that these incentives
do little to actually attract investment, the states continue to engage in
incentive wars.
3
A number of commentators have argued that the states persist in
unproductive incentive wars because they are trapped in a prisoners'
dilemma.4 The prisoners' dilemma suggests that states would not grant
incentives if they could ensure that no other state would. 5 However,
because they do not wish to fall behind other states in the bidding for
investment, they grant incentives, despite their harmful effects. While this
model successfully describes why a state may enact an incentive even after
it decides that it will not be beneficial, it falls to consider the alternative
reasons a state may have for wanting to grant an incentive. Because of this
deficiency of the prisoners' dilemma as an explanatory tool, this Note
* B.A., Columbia University (1998); J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law (2001). I would like to thank Amy McGann for her patience and support
during the writing of this Note, and Professor Hiram Chodosh for his continuing guidance
and ability to demonstrate the value in both process and product.
1 See Robert G. Lynch, The Effectiveness of State and Local Tax Cuts and Incentives: A
Review of the Literature, 11 STATE TAX NoTEs 949-53 (1996).
2 See Peter Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 380 (1996).
3 Seeid.
4 See Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting from a
Prisoner's Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the
Appropriateness of a Federal Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REv. 303 (1998); see also
Enrich, supra note 2, at 396-97.
5 See infra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
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argues that the prisoners' dilemma scenario must be adjusted to grasp the
complexities of potential justifications for relocation incentives.6
Section II of the Note provides a brief background outlining
investment attraction incentives and their theoretical effects. Section III
first explains how the prisoners' dilemma has been applied in the context of
investment relocation decisions. It then compares the national treatment of
incentives in the United States and in Canada. Section IV argues that much
of the literature on relocation incentives uses the prisoners' dilemma to
explain only a portion of a state's possible motivations in enacting
incentives.
II. BACKGROUND OF INVESTMENT RELOCATION INCENTIVES
A. Investment Relocation Incentives Defined
Investment attraction incentives belong to one of two categories: 1)
tax incentives; and 2) non-tax incentives, or subsidies.7 Tax incentives are
typically exemptions, credits, refunds or abatements from state taxes, while
subsidies can take any of a number of forms: cash grants, loans and
financing, or preferential government purchasing practices.8 Regardless of
type, these incentives "all share a common purpose: to enhance the state's
attractiveness as a place for businesses to locate their facilities and their
jobs." 9
Investment attraction incentives share three common characteristics.10
First, incentives are narrowly focused on specific industries or economic
sectors." Second, incentives are "fairly direct, requiring cash outlays from
governmental treasuries and creating tax burdens borne by the general
public."' 2 Finally, incentives can be characterized as "conscious efforts to
influence the future direction of state economies."'13
6 See infra Section IV.
7 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 306-7; see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 384-85.
8 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 306-7; see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 385.
9 Enrich, supra note 2, at 387.
10 See Mark L. Taylor, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEx.
L. REv. 669, 676 (1994).
11 See id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
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B. Theoretical Effects of Investment Relocation Incentives
Traditional economic theory indicates that unless offered to correct
for an externality or a market failure, state investment attraction incentives
distort interstate trade, thus reducing the national welfare.' 4 Trade literature
provides a useful model to illustrate the effects of state incentives on three
categories of states: 1) the subsidizing state; 2) states which are net
importers of a product manufactured in a subsidizing state; and 3) states
which are net exporters of a product manufactured in a subsidizing state.
15
This model of theoretical effects of incentives is equally valid for both tax
incentives and non-tax subsidies, as the real-world effect of a tax credit is
equivalent to that of a cash subsidy.
16
1. Effects of Incentives on the Subsidizing State
When a state offers an investment attraction incentive to an
industry, it incurs costs, while reaping benefits. In addition to the lower
price that its citizens will pay for the subsidized good,17 the state will reap
the marginal benefits of newly created jobs and increased tax revenue
generated by the increased income, spending, and property values of both
the new industry and its citizens.' 8 At the same time, the state will have to
bear the cost of the incentive. 19 A state that offers an investment relocation
14 See Bernard S. Friedman, Subsidies, in THE McGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS 964, 966 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 2d. ed. 1994); see also Peter Gerhart,
Lecture, A Typology of International Economic Law (Nov. 4 1999) (lecture notes on file
with author).
is See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 307; See also generally JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 250-254 (2d ed., 1997).
16 See CAMPBELLR. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS, 150 (J.S. Dietrich et al. eds., 7th ed. 1978)
(explaining that because subsidies "rechannel tax revenues back to households and
businesses, these payments in effect are 'negative taxes."'). See also Walter Hellerstein &
Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 789, 835 (1996) (noting that "[e]conomists know that the real-world
impact of such a subsidy mirrors the effect of the [tax] credit" (citing ROBERT L.
HEILBRONER & LESTER C. THuROw, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED 173 (updated ed. 1987))).
17 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 964 (explaining that "[slubsidies generally allow a
buyer to receive a good or service for a lower price than would otherwise have been
necessary"); see also BRANKo HORVAT, THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 132-33
(1999) (comparing the effects of subsidies to those of tariffs).
18 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308-9 (indicating that subsidizing states may experience
a net gain in tax revenues generated by having resident industries).
19 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 387-88 (citing states' tax-expenditure reports to
demonstrate the great costs incurred by attraction subsidies).
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incentive to an industry suffers a welfare reduction because the incentive
results in the production of goods to the point where marginal costs exceed
the marginal benefits.20
Incentives have the additional effect of enhancing the exportability
of the subsidized product into an importing state.2 ' This is because the
producer of the subsidized product is able to offer the product at a lower
cost than would be possible without the subsidy. 2   Conversely, the
incentive may restrain imports to the subsidizing state.23 The producer of
the subsidized product is again able to offer the product at a lower cost than
would be possible without the incentive, which is also presumably lower
than the cost offered by the out-of-state producer.
24
Incentives do not always cause a welfare reduction.25 In some
cases, an incentive may provide correction for an externality or a market
failure.26 In other words, the subsidized industry may provide benefits to
the state that are not accounted for by the market.27 Professor Matthew
Schaefer points to the subsidization of dairy farmers in Massachusetts as an
incentive which arguably corrects for a market failure: "the existence of
dairy farms in Massachusetts, it might be argued, has a value, namely
enhancing the culture, the atmosphere, and perhaps even tourism of the
state, that is not captured by the market., 28
2. Effects of Incentives on States that are Net Importers of a
Product Manufactured by an Industry Subsidized by Another
State
A state that is a net importer of a product that is manufactured by
an industry subsidized by a neighboring state may actually experience a
short-term increase in welfare.2 9 The net importing state will receive the
20 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 307.
21 See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 250.
22 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 964 (pointing out the U.S. hospital subsidies as an
example of how subsidies lower a consumer's cost paid for the subsidized good).
23 See Jackson, supra note 15, at 250-51.
24 See id.
25 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 966.
26 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308; see also Gerhart, supra note 14.
27 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308.
28 Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308. Schaefer also notes that "similar arguments are in fact
made by the European Community in international trade negotiations regarding its small
farmers." Id.
29 See id.
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benefit of lower prices for the subsidized product.30 If the benefit of lower
prices to local consumers outweighs the potential costs caused by another
state's incentive, the importing state will receive a net welfare gain.
31
These gains are likely to be short-lived for a number of reasons.32
First of all, it may be difficult to achieve a Pareto improvement, that is, to
redistribute the gains received by the local consumers to the producers who
bear the costs. 33 While the consumers may be better off with the imported
good subsidized, the local producers may be unable to compete with the
lower price of the imported good.34 In this situation, the state may actually
suffer a decrease in welfare because the loss experienced by the state's local
producers may be more burdensome to the state than the local consumers'
gains are beneficial. The state could potentially suffer costs in the form of
lost jobs, lower tax revenues, and lost profits of local producers, who are
unable to match the low price offered by their subsidized competitor.
35
Secondly, if the subsidization is predatory (i.e., seeking to eliminate
competition), welfare gains will quickly disa6ppear as local producers are
driven from local and neighboring markets. Finally, the incentive may
prevent industry from moving to the importing state, bringing numerous
benefits, such as jobs, tax revenue, and lower costs of societal benefit
payments to that state.
37
3. Effect of Incentives on States that are Net Exporters of a
Product Manufactured by an Industry Subsidized by Another
State
A state which is a net exporter of a product manufactured by an
industry subsidized by a neighboring state will suffer a welfare loss for
many of the same reasons as a net importing state.38 Just as the importing
30 See JACKSON, supra note 14, at 250; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308; see also
GARY C. HUFBAUER & JOANNA SHELTON ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1984).
31 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308.
32 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 309.
33 See Martin C. McGuire, Normative Economics, in THE MCGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ECONOMICS, 744-45 (Douglas Greenwald ed., 2d ed., 1994). The Pareto criterion is a
widely-accepted tool for evaluating alternative states. It proposes that one situation (X) is a
Pareto improvement over another (Y) if no person is worse off at X than at Y, and at least
one person is better off at X than at Y. See also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 309.
34 See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 250.
35 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 308.
36 See id at 309; see also HUFBAUER & SHELTON ERB, supra note 30, at 5.
37 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 309.
38 See id.
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state, the net-exporting state will benefit from the lower price of the
imported goods, but suffer the loss of profits and sales of local producers.
39
However, the exporting state is more vulnerable to the neighbor's incentive
than a net-importing state. This is because as a net-exporter, the state by
definition exports more goods than it imports. This virtually guarantees
that the harm experienced by local producers will exceed the local
consumer benefit of lower prices for the subsidized good.
40
It is important to realize that a state that is a net exporter relies on
its products being sold outside of its borders for its income. It is impossible
for an exporting state to sell its products outside of its borders if
neighboring states are offering the same product for lower prices.
Therefore, the incentive may act as a trade barrier not only around the
subsidizing state, but also around other net-importing states.4' The
exporting state suffers additional harm for each state in which the
subsidized good is offered for a lower price than its own exported good.
4. Benefits of Incentives
Investment relocation incentives cause potentially negative
economic effects in both subsidizing and neighboring states. However,
there are two major benefits for subsidizing states. The first of these is
local autonomy. 42 Granting incentives to corporations "allows small groups
of like-minded individuals to control their own destiny. 43 When states
experiment with social and economic policy independently, the nation as a
whole has the opportunity to see the comparative effects of the different
policies.44 At the same time, other communities within the nation are
insulated from the consequences of economic experimentation if the
39 See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
40 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 309.
41 See JACKSON, supra note 15, at 250. Jackson gives the following example:
"[S]ubsidies from country A can enhance the exportation of its products to a third country,
C, where they compete with similar products that are exported from country B." Id. In
Jackson's example, country A represents the subsidizing state, country C represents the net-
importing state, and country B represents the net-exporting state. Country A's subsidies
may present trade barriers to many of country B's trading partners, thus causing considerable
harm.
42 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 691.
43 Id.
44 See id. (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
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experiment fails.45 This insulation effect of state-level experimentation
allows states that wish to make their business environments more attractive
to outside investment to choose between short-term benefits of incentives
and the long-term benefits of increasing budgets for education and
workforce training.46
Incentives can provide a second benefit by enhancing the economic
competitiveness of the state.47  Offering incentives, which target
corporations are likely to view as a "pro-business investment" on the state's
part, gives immediate evidence of the state's desire to improve their
business environment.48 State incentives may also raise the economic
competitiveness of the nation as a whole if they are offered to corporations
in neighboring countries.
49
5. Two Competing Views of the Effectiveness of Investment
Relocation Incentives:
50
a. Incentives as an Effective Tool for Attracting Investment5'
One version of the theoretical effects of state investment relocation
incentives asserts that incentives are effective in attracting investment, and
that a state can change the location decision of a business by granting
incentives.5 z Incentives, such as an educated workforce or proximity to
natural resources can help a state overcome the economic advantages of its
neighbors.53 If a state uses incentives properly, it will be able to attract
45 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
46 See generally Gerhart, supra note 14 (giving examples of expenditures that may make
a state's business environment more attractive to outside investment).
47 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 691-92.
48 Id. at 692.
49 See id. at 691-92 (noting that state subsidies are "sometimes justified as a means of
economic competitiveness that enhances the United States position in the world
marketplace.") (citing Marco Menezes & Lawrence W. Morgan, P.A. 198: Michigan's
Industrial Property Tax Abatement Law: Fortune or Futility?, 7 COOLEY L. REv. 139
(1990)) (characterizing Michigan's incentive program as a "response to cyclical economic
fluctuations and long-term restructuring of the global economy").
50 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 309-10. Schaefer's framework highlights the major
arguments of the two competing views on state subsidy wars. Other contributors to the
discussion are noted within this Note.
51 See id. at 309.
52 See id.
51 See id.
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investment, increase its tax revenue, and enhance its growth much more
quickly than with long-term strategies.
54
If this first version is correct, states should be essentially free to
enact incentives if they believe it to be in their best interest. A state's local
autonomy will allow it to determine whether its business environment will
be better served by focusing on short-term benefit by granting incentives, or
by focusing on long-term improvement by raising educational and
workforce standards. There is still a risk that states may improperly
identify and measure externalities when granting incentives, which will
result in an inefficient allocation of resources.55
b. Incentives as an Ineffective Tool for Attracting Investment
The second version of state relocation argues that businesses make
their location decisions "based on the general business climate of a state
and other natural advantages of locating within the state.' 56 This presents
two possible outcomes. The first possibility is that incentives are not
substantial enough to overcome the locational advantages of their
neighbors, leading a business to locate in the state they would have picked
without consideration of the incentive.57 The alternative possibility is that
competing incentives offered by neighboring states cancel each other out,
again leading a business to locate in the state they would have picked
58
without consideration of the incentive.
If this second version is correct, one must come to the inescapable
conclusion that incentives are "unnecessary 'give-aways." 5 9 Even if a state
is accurately measuring externalities, the incentive it grants will have no
effect on the location decision of a business.
60
The state may also face the danger of manipulation by industry.
Incentives are often objected to on the grounds that they favor industry
special interests that have the finances to manipulate the political process. 61
Public choice theory suggests that national trade policies are formed by
interest group politics. 62 Firms that are well-organized and well-financed
54 See id.
55 See id. at 310.
56 Id. at 309.
57 See id.
58 See id.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 688.
62 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty
Cases, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON 5, 18 (1996); see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 310
(suggesting that incentives are a particularly attractive option for state politicians, who
[Vol. 33:71
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are likely to exert considerable influence on state policy formation,
particularly if a state believes the firm will consider the state's incentive
policy when choosing a location.63 This presents a problem for the state
that may be pressured into granting an incentive that is either too large or
completely unnecessary. In addition, small companies may be hurt because
they lack the political influence of their larger counterparts. 64
6. Which Version is Closer to the Truth?
According to Schaefer, "empirical data and surveys of business
executives indicate that the second version is closer to reality than the first,
although there is some indication that incentives may act as a 'tie-breaker'
if all other factors are equal., 65 The effectiveness of incentives has been
studied through both survey and econometric research. 66 Survey research
asks businesses about the influence of taxes and incentives on investment
location decisions. The overwhelming majority of the surveys indicate that
tax incentives "play little or no role in investment decisions. ' '67 The
econometric studies show similar results, concluding that state incentives
fail in stimulating state economic growth.
68
receive more favorable attention by attracting employers than by focusing on long-term
strategies such as raising education standards); see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 389 ("In a
period marked by weak economic growth and diminishing economic opportunities for many
workers, the creation and retention of good jobs has inevitably become a political priority for
state governments." Id.).
63 See Sykes, supra note 62, at 18.
64 See id.
65 Schaefer, supra note 4, at 310.
66 See Lynch, supra note 1, at 949.
67 Id. Lynch explains that "hundreds of surveys" come to the conclusion that incentives
do not influence business location decisions. Id. However, he notes that recent surveys have
found that tax incentives played a role in location decisions, particularly for those businesses
that had received incentives. Lynch is skeptical of those findings, though, believing that
businesses may "exaggerate the positive effects of tax incentives on their investment
decisions," knowing they may influence future policy. Id. at 949-50. Lynch explains that
"[a] business executive who admits that the incentive received by his/her firm had no effect
might cause political problems for the firm if specific survey responses became known.
Furthermore, even if there is little risk of specific survey responses being released,
executives responding to the survey might feel enough solidarity with business political
interests to want the general findings of the study to indicate that tax and other incentives for
business are needed." Id. at 950. (quoting Timothy Bartik, Who Benefits from State and
Local Economic Development Policies?, W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT
RESEARCH 21 (1991)).
68 See id. at 950 (summarizing the main findings of the studies, which conclude that
"[t]here is no evidence that state and local tax cuts, when paid for by reducing public
20011
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State taxes represent a small portion of coTorate budgets, too small
to greatly influence business location decisions. 9 Businesses are more
likely to be influenced by factors that characterize the business environment
of the state, such as wages, employee skill levels, availability of raw
materials, strength of markets, and regulatory stringency.70 One must be
careful not to draw a concrete line between these influencing factors, with
incentives on one side and other labor and market factors on the other.
Incentives are very much intertwined with these other influencing factors,
and often the presence of an incentive will indicate the absence of stringent
regulations. 71 For example, a state that grants an incentive may have less
money to raise education levels, but it will also have less money to enforce
environmental regulations. Businesses do not focus on the factors
individually, but as integrated parts of a state's business environment.
Regardless of fiscal success or failure, incentives improve the
business environment of the state in other subtle ways. Granting an
incentive will inevitably make a state more attractive to the business
community by appealing to "the business community's perception of the
state's responsiveness to business concerns. 72  Along similar lines,
granting incentives may also appeal to the sensibilities of state residents,
who may appreciate the government's attempt to stimulate local growth.73
Of course, this must be understood with the caveat that politicians may try
to conceal from their constituents the fact that an incentive is ineffective.
services, stimulate economic activity or create jobs," "[tihere is little evidence that the level
of state and local taxation figures prominently in business decisions," and that "[f]actors
such as the cost and quality of labor, the quality of public services.... the proximity to
markets, and the access to raw materials and supplies are more important than tax incentives
in business location decisions").
69 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 392.
70 See id.
71 See Gerhart, supra note 14.
72 Enrich, supra note 2, at 393-94. Enrich observes that "businesses that stand to benefit
from state incentives have learned to fuel the interstate competition," and that "[b]usinesses
have become increasingly adept at playing the states off against one another to stimulate
more attractive offers." Id. at 394-95.
73 See id. at 394 (noting that "[b]y taking visible steps to encourage economic growth,
[politicians] can take credit for subsequent economic successes, whatever their actual causes,
and avoid blame for any losses of jobs to other states that otherwise would have been
attributed to them if they had failed to act. From a political perspective, doing something is
almost always better than doing nothing, particularly in regard to an issue about which
voters care deeply." Id.)
74 See id.
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11-1. THE PROBLEM OF INVESTMENT RELOCATION INCENTIVES
A. The Prisoners' Dilemma and its Relation to Investment
Attraction Incentives
Many commentators have expressed the idea that states involved in
incentive wars are faced with the classic prisoners' dilemma.75 The
prisoners' dilemma is a game theory model used to illustrate typical
problems of policy formation when involved parties are unable to secure a
binding, enforceable agreement.76
Two prisoners are separately interrogated by the authorities, who
attempt to extract confessions from each implicating the other. If both are
silent, each will go free. If both confess, each will get a moderate
sentence. If one confesses and the other does not, the former will get a
light sentence and the latter a heavy sentence. Accordingly, both
prisoners would be best off if each remains silent, but each fears the other
will confess. To avoid the danger of the heavy sentence [that would
follow from the other's confession], each confesses and incurs a moderate
sentence. The prisoners are unable to reach their preferred outcome (total
silence) because they are unable to communicate and reach a binding
agreement.77
The following diagram can illustrate the problem:78
Outcome is (Pl's P1 doesn't confess P1 confesses
sentence, P 2's
sentence)
P2 doesn't confess (0 years, 0 years) (1 year, 10 years)
P2 confesses (10 years, 1 years) (5 years, 5 years)
75 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 311; see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 396-97; Taylor,
supra note 10, at 693; Steven R. Little, Comment, Corporate Welfare Wars: The
Insufficiency of Current Constraints on State Action and the Desirability of a Federal
Legislative Response, 22 HAMLNE L. REv. 849, 858-859 (1999).
76 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 311. See also James A. Brander, Economic Policy
Formation in a Federal State: A Game Theoretic Approach, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS 33, 41-42 (Richard Simeon ed., 1985).
77 Taylor, supra note 10, at 693, n.155 (citing Richard B. Stewart, Environmental
Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALEL.. 2039, 2058 n.84 (1993)).
78 The numerical values assigned to each of the four outcomes are merely representative
of what may be a light, moderate, or a heavy sentence. For further discussion of the
problems with assigning values for outcomes in the prisoners' dilemma model, see notes
266-269 and accompanying text.
2001]
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The prisoners' dilemma can be used as a model to demonstrate
some of the problems states have when deciding whether to offer
investment attraction incentives. According to most evidence, states would
be better off if no incentives were offered. 79 However, if a state chooses
not to offer a incentive and other states do, the former state will likely lose
tax revenue and investment capital to the latter state which has granted the
incentive. 80 Therefore, to avoid this loss of revenue and capital, both states
offer incentives, potentially causing the welfare distortions discussed above
in Section IIIB. The following diagram illustrates the prisoners' dilemma
states face.
Outcome: (State,, State, offers no State, offers
State2) incentives incentives
State2 offers no (neither experience (SI gets business
incentives revenue losses) and related benefits,
S2 loses same)
State2 offers (5I loses business and (both experience
incentives related benefits, S2  revenue losses)
gains same)
In the model, the prisoners each confess because they are unable to
communicate with one another. This is not the case with states, which can
theoretically communicate easily with one another. However, states have
been unable to enforce an agreement among themselves that forbid granting
relocation incentives.8' The failure of the states in forming binding
agreements prohibiting relocation incentives effectively leaves the states in
the same position as the prisoners. Without the ability to execute a binding
agreement against incentives with other states, a state is forced to enact
incentives to ensure its economic and political position relative to its
neighbors.82 The model predicts that a state will choose a less desirable
79 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 693; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 311. Schaefer
agrees that "each state would be better off not offering investment attraction subsidies (i.e.
'remaining silent') with one small qualification" (emphasis added). "[1]n a situation in
which two states are bidding against one another, the state with the greater externalities
should be allowed to be the sole bidder and then only to the extent of the externality
difference. However, since externalities may be difficult to measure and in many cases there
may not be significant differences between states in terms of externalities associated with an
attracted enterprise, this qualification is not so large." Id.
80 See id.
81 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 693 (citing Chris Christoff, Engler Pushes for States to
End Fights over Business, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 5, 1992, at 2E ("observing that state
governments are under political pressure to take action to attract new jobs and noting that
incentives are seen as a way to do this." Taylor, n. 10).
82 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 396-97.
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outcome in order to protect itself from losing potential business to
neighboring states.
B. Differing National Treatments of State Relocation Incentives
State relocation incentives are of concern to nations and trade
regions around the world.83 Attempts to address these relocation incentives
have varied according the economic and political structures of the specific
nation or region. Examining different national policies toward relocation
incentives reveals different strategies in balancing the value of local
authority with the economic well being of the nation. A particularly useful
comparison can be made between the United States treatment of relocation
incentives, which has been judicial, and the recent attempt by Canada to
address incentives with an interprovincial internal trade agreement.
1. Relocation Incentives in the United States
The Constitution of the United States specifically enumerates
Congress with the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States..."84 This Commerce Clause was intended to
create a free trade area within the borders of the United States,85 and to rid
the nation of the economic competition between states present during the
time of the Articles of Confederation.86 From its very beginning,
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has construed the term "commerce"
expansively, 87 and the Court has held that Congress may regulate channels
of commerce, instruments of commerce, and activities substantially related
to interstate commerce.88
83 See generally Schaefer, supra note 4, at 323-35 (comparing the treatment of relocation
incentives by the United States, Canada, the European Community, and the WTO).
84 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
85 See Little, supra note 75, at 864 (citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935)
(recognizing "that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in
the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division")).
86 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 422-23.
87 See Little, supra note 75, at 864 (citing Phillip M. Tatarowicz & Rebecca F. Mims-
Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Discrimination Under the Commerce Clause,
39 VANM. L. REV. 879, 887 (1986), citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 189 (1824)) (holding
that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches." Id. at 189-90).
88 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-9 (holding that the Gun-Free Schools Act of
1994 was an unconstitutional use of the Congressional Commerce power, as possessing a
firearm in a school zone did not substantially relate to interstate commerce).
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The Commerce Clause also acts as a limit on state regulation of
interstate commerce. Under the dormant Commerce Clause, state
commercial regulation is unconstitutional if it places an undue burden on
interstate commerce.
89
[The Dormant Commerce Clause] prohibits economic protectionism -
that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors. Thus, state statutes
that clearly discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely
struck down, .. .unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by
a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.
90
Thus, states are prohibited from enacting tariffs on out-of-state
products or enacting other protectionist regulations or taxes.91 Under this
rationale, relocation incentives may be viewed as regulations that hinder the
free trade area created by the Commerce Clause by unconstitutionally
discriminating against out-of-state interests.92
In addressing relocation incentives, the Supreme Court has issued
decisions wrought with tension between two guiding principles.9 3 First, the
Court has repeatedly declared that States are free to use their tax systems
and subsidization of industry to encourage economic growth.94 Second, the
Court has struck down state tax measures and subsidization designed to
89 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 282-83
(1997).
90 New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-4 (1988).
91 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 322.
92 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 424. Professor Enrich argues that "the Commerce Clause
should be understood to constrain these state business tax incentives in the same way that it
constrains other measures designed to set a state's economy apart from the nation's. This
conclusion derives powerful support from an understanding of the origins and historical
function of the Commerce Clause as a bulwark for an open national economy. It also
follows directly from a substantial body of modem Supreme Court case law, which applies
the Commerce Clause as a prohibition against a range of state tax provisions that
discriminate against interstate commerce." Id.
93 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 791 (recognizing "a palpable tension in
the Supreme Court's decisions); see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 425 (noting that "the
course of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has been tortuous").
94 See id. at 791-92 (citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214
n.15 (1994) (holding "'[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run
afoul' of the negative Commerce Clause." (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988))), (also citing Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,
336 (1977) (declaring that the "[Court's] decisions do [1 not prevent the States from
structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate
commerce and industry.")).
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achieve those goals on the grounds that they discriminate against out-of-
state investment.95  Commentators have struggled to distinguish
constitutionally allowable relocation incentives designed to encourage
economic growth from unconstitutional discriminatory relocation incentives
with the same goals.96
The Court has analyzed relocation incentives differently, depending
on whether they are tax incentives, such as tax credits, exemptions or
abatements, or non-tax incentives, such as cash subsidies.97 Over the past
twenty years, the Court has attempted to settle the constitutional uncertainty
regarding state tax incentives.98 However, the Court, by its own admission,
has "never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies....,99
Despite the relatively small amount of case law on non-tax subsidies, it may
be possible to apply the Court's analysis of tax incentives to these non-tax
incentives to determine their constitutionality.
a. Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations on Tax Incentives -
Case Law
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has long prohibited state taxes that
discriminate against interstate commerce, 100 and the Court has clearly
established that a tax that imposes greater burdens on out-of-state interests
than on competing in-state interests will be invalidated as a discriminatory
tax under the Commerce Clause.101 The 1977 decision of Complete Auto
Transit v. Brady1 02 set forth a four-factor test to determine whether a state
95 See id., (citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc., v. Healy, 114 S.Ct. 2205, at 2211-14 (1994)
(striking down a Massachusetts subsidy to local dairy farms paid out of a tax on all dairy
farms selling milk in Massachusetts on the grounds that it "discriminate[d] in favor of local
producers." Id. at 2215; also citing Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318,
331 (1997)(invalidating a New York statutory amendment because it "foreclose[d] tax-
neutral decisions and create[d] both an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a
discriminatory burden on commerce to its sister States." Id.)).
96 See id. at 791.
97 See generally Schaefer, supra note 4, at 323-27 (evaluating the likelihood of a
successful Commerce Clause challenge against tax incentives and non-tax incentives
independently); see also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16 (distinguishing the
constitutional analysis of tax incentives and subsidy incentives).
98 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 425.
99 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994).
100 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 793 (citing Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S.
275 (1875)).
101 See id.
102 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause. 103 The Court explained that its
"decisions... have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge
when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State." 104
It is the third element of the Complete Auto test - the anti-
discrimination prong - that is of primary importance in analyzing tax
incentives.10 5 However, the Court has not given much insight into what
constitutes a discriminatory tax provision.106  Nonetheless, in the last
twenty years, the Court has invalidated four tax provisions designed to
encourage economic activity within the state. 07 None of these decisions
has held that tax incentives are discriminatory per se; however, they have
caused many commentators to doubt the constitutionality of all state tax
incentives.10 Ultimately, these decisions are essential in understanding the
difficult problem of balancing economic welfare against state autonomy. In
the following series of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that states
have valid reasons for enacting incentives, and may be constitutionally
permitted to do so.
103 See id.; see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 425 (explaining that "the Court in the last two
decades has sought to impose some order on its dormant commerce clause analysis of state
taxation by relying on the principles articulated in its 1977 decision of Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady.")
104 Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
105 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 426.
106 See id; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 324 (observing that "[tihere exists a degree
of uncertainty over exactly which investment attraction tax incentives would run afoul of
dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.").
107 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 794. Professors Hellerstein & Coenen
examine the four recent major Supreme Court decisions which rule on state tax incentives in
an effort to determine the constitutionality of other such incentives. The four decisions are
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (invalidating a New York
amendment to a New York tax providing a lower transfer tax rate on stock transfers
occurring within New York), Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding
that a Hawaii exemption from a state excise tax given to local alcoholic beverage producers
was unconstitutionally discriminatory), Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388
(1984) (invalidating a New York income tax credit which based the credit amount on the
percentage of the taxpayer's business conducted within New York), and New Energy Co. of
Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (striking down an Ohio tax credit against a motor fuel
tax for each gallon of ethanol sold, but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio).
108 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 794 (noting that the Court invalidated tax
incentives "with rhetoric so sweeping as to cast a constitutional cloud over all state tax
incentives." ); see generally, Enrich, supra note 2, at 424-26 (examining the "tensions about
how far the courts should delve into the empirical effects of particular tax provisions." Id. at
425-26); Schaefer, supra note 4, at 324-26 (analyzing Hellerstein's & Coenen's arguments
vis- -vis Enrich's arguments).
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The first of these four decisions was Boston Stock Exchange v.
State Tax Commission,109 in which the Court considered a challenge to an
amendment to a New York stock transfer tax designed to encourage the
growth of the New York securities industry." Beginning in 1905, New
York had collected a state transfer tax on the sale of securities occurring
within the state of New York."' In 1968, in an effort to encourage
nonresident stock sellers to complete their sales through New York
brokers," 2 the state amended the transfer tax so that securities sales made
through out-of-state brokers would be taxed at a higher rate than sales made
through brokers located in New York.1
3
The Court unanimously struck down the amendment, finding that
"[New York] violated '[tihe very purpose of the Commerce Clause [which]
was to create an area of free trade among the several states."' l 4 The
original transfer tax "was neutral as to in-state and out-of-state sales,
'15
imposing a burden which "fell equally on all transactions regardless of the
situs of sale."'" 6 However, the 1968 amendment "upset this equilibrium,"
"foreclos[ing] tax-neutral decisions and creat[ing] both an advantage for the
exchanges in New York and a discriminatory burden on commerce to its
sister states."'" 7 Because the amended transfer tax "impose[d] a greater tax
liability on out-of-state sales than on in-state sales, ... [it] [fell] short of the
substantially evenhanded treatment demanded by the Commerce Clause."'l18
Sellers' decisions as to where to sell securities would be influenced by their
potential tax liability; sellers who wished to reduce their tax liability would
be influenced to sell through a New York broker." 9 This struck the Court
as an inappropriate use of coercive power by the state,12 which was "using
its power to tax an in-state operation as a means of 'requiring [other]
business operations to be performed in the home state."
2
'
109 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Conm'n., 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
n1 See Little, supra note 75, at 866-67.
111 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 319.
"
2 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 795.
1 13 See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 319.
114 Enrich, supra note 2, at 427 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 328).
"1 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 330.
116 Id.
"7 Id. at 330, 331.
118 Id. at 332.
"
9 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16 at 795.
120 See id.
121 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 145 (1970)).
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Tax incentives, by their very design, strive to "foreclose tax-neutral
decisions" by influencing corporate location decisions with potential tax
liability. 22 It has been observed that the Court's ruling in Boston Stock
Exchange could therefore be read to invalidate all state tax incentives.1 3
However, the Court specifically limited its holding to the specific tax
amendment challenged, 124 noting that the decision "does not prevent the
States from structuring their tax systems to encourage the growth and
development of intrastate commerce and industry." 125 The Court continued,
"[n]or do we hold that a State may not compete with other States for a share
of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free trade
policy. ' 126 While the Court clearly upheld the right of States to use their
tax systems to encourage local economic growth, it did not explain how a
State could structure a tax incentive under the ruling of Boston Stock
Exchange. 1
27
The next major Court decision on state tax incentives was
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully,128  which considered the
constitutionality of a New York state franchise tax credit. In 1971, as an
incentive for "U.S. firms to increase their exports,"'129 Congress gave a
special income tax exemption to a new corporate entity called a Domestic
International Sales Corporation (DISC).130 This change in the federal tax
code was a cause for concern for the state of New York. If it followed the
example of Congress and exempted all DISC income from being taxable,
the state stood to lose between $20 and $30 million every year.' On the
other hand, the state was concerned that state taxation of DISC income
would drive qualified DISCs out of the state.
1 32
As a compromise between these two interests, the New York
legislature enacted tax legislation that took three steps in determining the
tax liability of DISCs within New York.133 The first step was to combine a
122 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 795 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at
331).
123 See id.
124 See Little, supra note 75, at 867.
125 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 336.
126 Id. at 336-37.
127 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 796.
128 Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
129 Id. at 390 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-533, at 9 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1825, 1827; S. REP. No. 92-437, at 12 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1918, 1922.)
130 See id.; see also 26 U.S.C. §§ 991-997. 26 U.S.C. §§ 992(a), 993 define a corporation
as a DISC if more than 95% of its gross receipts and its assets are export-related.
131 See Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 392.
132 See id. at 392-93.
133 See N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 208-219-a (McKinney 2000).
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DISC's income with that of its parent company. 34  Next, New York
granted a tax credit for the DISC income, lowering the tax rate on DISC
income to 30% of the original rate. 35 Finally, and most importantly, the
DISC was limited by the DISC's "New York export ratio," which reflected
the ratio of the DISC's export receipts derived from activity within New
York to the DISC's total export receipts. 3 6 The resulting effect was that
when a DISC increased its amount of export activity within New York, it
received a larger tax credit - and a lower tax rate - on its income.
Conversely, when a DISC moved export activity outside of New York, its
tax credit for DISC income would be limited, and the tax rate would be
higher.
It was this third step - the limiting of the tax credit to reflect the
DISC's export ratio - which caused the Court to invalidate the tax. 137 New
York argued that "multiplying the allowable credit by the New York export
ration of the DISC merely ensures that the State is not allowing a parent
corporation to claim a tax credit with respect to DISC income that is not
taxable by the State of New York."' 38 The Court rejected this argument,
though, finding that "the percentage of the DISC's accumulated income that
is subject to New York franchise tax is determined by the parent's business
allocation percentage, not by the export ratio."' 39 The procedure for
calculating the maximum allowable DISC credit
alleviates the State's fears that it will be overly generous with its tax
credit, for once the adjustment of multiplying the allowable DISC export
credit by the parent's business allocation percentage has been
accomplished, the tax credit has been fairly apportioned to apply only to
the amount of the accumulated DISC income taxable to New York. 40
In the Court's view, the additional credit limitation to reflect the
New York export ratio was both "inaccurate and duplicative."'
4
'
Relying heavily on Boston Stock Exchange,42 the Court found that
the New York tax placed a discriminatory burden on out-of-state interests.
134 See id. at § 208.9(i)(B).
135 See id. at § 210.3(a).
136 Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 393-94.
137 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 798.
138 Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 399.
139 Id.
14' Id.
141 Id.
142 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 429 (noting that the Court was "[d]rawing heavily on
Boston Stock Exchange..." Id.); see also Little, supra note 75 at 870 (noting that the Court
2001]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
The Court held that "[w]hether the discriminatory tax diverts new business
into the State or merely prevents current business being diverted elsewhere,
it is still a discriminatory tax that 'forecloses tax-neutral decisions.' 143 In
its effort to encourage local economic growth, New York had placed a
discriminatory burden on interstate commerce. 144
The New York tax scheme had one additional feature that was
unique in the Court's tax incentive cases, one that the Court found
particularly troubling. 145 Whereas other tax credits 146 varied only with the
amount of activity in the taxing state, the New York DISC credit also varied
if the amount of activity in New York remained the same, but increased
outside of New York. Put another way, if a parent corporation kept its
DISC activity in New York constant, and also increased it in other states, its
New York DISC credit would be reduced because the DISC activity in New
York would represent a smaller percentage of the company's total DISC
activity. 147 The Court explained, "not only does the New York tax scheme
'provide a positive incentive for increased business activity in New York
State,' but also it [sic] penalizes increases in the DISC's shipping activities
in other States."'1
48
The third major Supreme Court decision on state tax incentives was
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.149 Bacchus Imports concerned an exemption
from Hawaii's tax on liquor sales for two locally produced alcoholic
beverages. The exemption was specifically designed to "aid Hawaiian
industry."' 5 ° The Court held that the Hawaii tax exemption had a "clearly
was "relying on Boston Stock Exchange..."); see also Hellerstein & Coenen supra note 16,
at 800 (commenting that the Court "found that New York's effort to encourage export
activity in the state suffered from constitutional infirmities similar to those that had disabled
New York's earlier effort to encourage brokerage activity in the state.").
143 Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax
Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318, 331) (omission in Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 406).
144 See id.
145 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 801.
146 See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n., 429 U.S. 318 (1977); see also,
e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
147 See Westinghouse Electric, 466 U.S. at 400.
148 Id. at 401 (quoting New York State Division of the Budget, Report on A. 12108-A and
S.10544, at 18 (May 23, 1972)).
149 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
150 Id. at 271. Hawaii created excise tax exemptions for two locally-produced beverages:
one, an indigenous Hawaiian brandy; two, pineapple wine. The legislative history of the tax
indicates that the brandy was exempted "to 'encourage and promote the establishment of a
new industry."' Id. at 270 (quoting S.L.H. 1960, c. 26, Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 87, in
1960 Senate Journal at 224). Similarly, the pineapple wine was exempted from the excise
tax "to help ... the local fruit wine industry." Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 270 (quoting
S.L.H. 1976, c. 39, Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 408-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 1056).
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discriminatory" effect because "it applie[d] only to locally produced
beverages.... It was irrelevant that Hawaii's purpose was to help local
producers and not to harm out-of-state producers. 3
2
While the Court recognized that "a State may enact laws pursuant
to its police powers that have the purpose and effect of encouraging
domestic industry," the Commerce Clause prohibits such encouragement
with tax structures that favor in-state over out-of-state products.
153
However, the Court offered no suggestions as to how a state might lawfully
encourage domestic industry, and gave no new insight into the limits of the
Commerce Clause prohibition. 1
54
The final major Supreme Court decision dealing with tax incentives
is New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach,55 which dealt with an
Ohio tax credit for local producers of ethanol.1 56 Largely produced from
corn, ethanol is blended with gasoline in the production of an automotive
fuel called gasohol.1 57 Beginning in 1981, Ohio offered a sales tax credit to
gasohol dealers for each gallon of ethanol used in their product, regardless
of the ethanol's source. 15 However, in 1984, Ohio limited the tax credit to
ethanol originating in Ohio or in a state that offered a similar exemption to
Ohio ethanol.
159
The Court pointed out that "[t]he Ohio provision at issue here
explicitly deprives certain products of generally available beneficial tax
treatment because they are made in certain other States, and thus on its face
appears to violate the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimination.' '160 Ohio
argued that the availability of the credit to ethanol producers in states
offering similar credits to Ohio ethanol producers "[was] likely to promote
[interstate commerce], by encouraging other States to enact similar tax
advantages that will spur the interstate sale of ethanol."' 161 The Court
quickly dismissed this, explaining that a state "may not use the threat of
151 Little, supra note 75, at 868 (quoting Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 271).
152 See Bacchus Imports Ltd., 468 U.S. at 273.
153 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 797 (quoting Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at
271).
154 See id.
155 New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
156 See id. at 271.
157 See id.
158 See id. at 272 (citing Act of June 10, 1981, § 1, 1981-2 Ohio Leg. Acts 1693, 1731-
1732).
159 See New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 272 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5735.145(B)
(1986)).
160 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274.
161 Id.
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economic isolation as a weapon to force sister States to enter into even a
desirable reciprocity agreement."162
Ohio pointed out that the appellant, an Indiana ethanol producer,
was eligible to receive an Indiana cash subsidy for local ethanol
producers.1 63 The Indiana subsidy program, Ohio argued, was "no less
discriminatory" than the Ohio tax credit, and "no less effective in
conferring a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors."' 164 The
Court dismissed this argument, noting, "[tlhe Commerce Clause does not
prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the
marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the
State's regulation of interstate commerce."' 16 Reiterating the principles of
Boston Stock Exchange,166 the Court held that "[d]irect subsidization of
domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the Commerce Clause]
prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does."'167
b. Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations on Tax Incentives -
Analysis
The Court's decisions give some guidance as to the
constitutionality of investment attraction tax incentives; however, they do
168Thnot remove all uncertainty as to the future of such incentives. The
Court's decisions indicate that a state may not enact a tax that discriminates
against out-of-state interests in an attempt to encourage growth of local
industry. 169 Nonetheless, it is unclear how the Court may treat a number of
typical state tax incentives used to attract out-of-state investment. The
Court's language suggests that all state tax incentive programs may be
found unconstitutional; 170 however, commentators have suggested that the
162Id. (quoting Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976)
(invalidating a Mississippi regulation which allowed out-of-state milk to be sold in
Mississippi only if the producing state accepted Mississippi milk reciprocally)).
163 See New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 277.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 278.
166 See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977) (declaring
that the Court decisions "[d]o not prevent the States from structuring their tax systems to
encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce and industry." Id.).
167 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
168 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 324; see also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at
802.
169 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 324 (citing Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263
(1984)).
170 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 802.
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Court is likely to take a more restrained approach, focusing on specific
factors in tax incentives that render them unconstitutional.
171
If one is to apply the four major Supreme Court decisions
concerning state tax incentives at their broadest, one could reach the
conclusion that all such incentives are unconstitutional.172 In Boston Stock
Exchange, the Court invalidated the New York tax because it eliminated the
"tax-neutral decisions" investors made when choosing a broker. 73 This
holding could potentially invalidate all state tax incentives, as tax incentives
are designed purposely to eliminate "tax-neutral decisions" in convincing
out-of-state investment to relocate in their state.174 However, the wide-
sweeping implications of interpreting the Court's decisions so broadly
suggests that the Court may follow a more restrained approach. 175
Keeping this restrained approach in mind, commentators have
suggested two sets of criteria that the Court may use in evaluating tax
incentives. 7 6 Professors Hellerstein and Coenen suggest that the Court will
171 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 324-26 (comparing the arguments of Professors
Hellerstein & Coenen to the arguments of Professor Enrich to demonstrate differing opinions
on the Court's view of tax incentives); see also Enrich, supra note 2, at 432-33 (attempting
to draw specific lessons from the Court's decisions); see generally Hellerstein & Coenen,
supra note 16, at 802-15 (comparing broad and restrained interpretations of the Court's
decisions).
172 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 802 (noting that "[a] literalistic focus on
key passages in the Court's opinions might suggest that 'all state inducement programs are
likely to be unconstitutional."' (quoting William J. Barrett VII, Note, Problems with State
Aid to New or Expanding Businesses, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1049 (1985))).
173 Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331.
17 4 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 802 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429
U.S. at 331).
175 See id. at 804. Professors Hellerstein and Coenen point out that virtually no state
income tax incentive satisfies the Court's requirement of "strict geographic neutrality." Id.
at 802. For example, Alabama provides an income tax credit for new investment in
Alabama; Colorado provides an income tax credit for purchasing qualifying property in
Colorado. Id. at 802-3. All of these income tax incentives provide "a tax benefit for in-state
investment that is not available for identical out-of-state investment," and "skew a
taxpayer's decision in favor of the former." Id. at 803. The same analysis applies to state
sales and property tax incentives designed to encourage local investment. Id. All tax
incentives, therefore, may potentially be attacked as violations of the Commerce Clause by
"inducing resources to be allocated among the states on the basis of tax criteria." Id. at 804.
While Hellerstein & Coenen recognize that the Court "revealed a willingness to subject a
wide array of fiscal measures to exacting scrutiny, striking down sales, income, and
transaction taxes" with "an extraordinary degree of consensus," and without "a single dissent
on the merits of the Commerce Clause issue," they believe that the Court's "opinions can
and should be read less expansively than their literal language permits." Id. at 804-5.
176 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 448-58; see also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at
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strike down a state tax incentive if it favors in-state activity over out-of-
state activity, while using the coercive power of state taxation. 77 All four
of the Court's tax incentive decisions satisfy these criteria, and all four were
struck down.
78
This test would invalidate many state tax incentives; however, one
significant category of tax incentives designed to encourage investment will
stand unscathed: tax incentives which are not exemptions from or
reductions of a taxpayer's existing tax liability, but which are exemptions or
reductions from the tax liability that would result if the taxpayer engaged in
the targeted activity in the state. 179 Under the Hellerstein and Coenen test,
income tax credits given for in-state investment would remain invalid, but
property tax abatements and sales tax exemptions given to new in-state
investment would be valid. 80 Whereas income tax credits would be invalid
because they favor in-state activity over out-of-state activity and involve the
coercive power of the state,' 8' property and sales tax exemptions "are valid
since the state is merely 'disclaiming the right to impose any taxes on a
"virgin" tax base the state is seeking to attract." ' 182
Such a property tax or sales tax exemption shows no favoritism for
local over out-of-state interests, and does not rely on the coercive power of
the state in attracting new investment. 83  To illustrate this distinction,
Professors Hellerstein and Coenen characterize the exempting state's
position as saying:
177 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 806.
178 See id. Boston Stock Exchange favored in-state over out-of-state sales; the Bacchus
Imports and New Energy Co. tax incentives favored in-state production over out-of-state
production; and Westinghouse Electric favored exportation occurring in-state over that
occurring out-of-state. Additionally, the state used its power of taxation to force in-state
investment: in Boston Stock Exchange, taxpayers would face higher transfer taxes unless
they used in-state brokers; in Bacchus Imports and New Energy Co., taxpayers would pay
higher taxes on liquor and fuel unless they supported local products; in Westinghouse
Electric, taxpayers would have a greater tax liability unless they increased their export
activity within the taxing state. See id.
179 See id. at 806-7.
180 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 325 (citing Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at
816-20, 825-34).
181 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 817 (explaining that such credits
"implicate the coercive power of the state, because the taxpayer can reduce its state tax bill
only by engaging in in-state activity").
182 Schaefer, supra note 4, at 325 (quoting Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 809).
183 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 808.
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Come to our state and we will not saddle you with any additional property
tax burdens. Moreover, should you choose not to accept our invitation,
nothing will happen to your tax bill .... 184
This position is contrasted with the position taken by tax incentive
cases the Court has confronted in the past, in which the state's position
could be characterized as saying:
You are already subject to our taxing power because you engage in
taxable activity in this state. If you would like to reduce your tax
burdens, you may do so by directing additional business activity into this
state. Should you decline our invitation, we will continue to exert our
taxing power over you as before, and your tax bill might even go up.185
This example demonstrates how the tax incentive provisions
invalidated by the Court utilized the coercive power of the state to
encourage development in-state.
Professor Enrich has suggested that a different set of criteria should
be used when evaluating Commerce Clause challenges to state tax
incentives. 8 6  Instead of the state-favoritism/state-coercion test that
Hellerstein and Coenen suggest, Enrich believes that the Court's primary
focus in evaluating a state tax incentive and whether it violates the
antidiscrimination principle has been "a practically oriented analysis of the
provision's purposes and effects.' 8 7 Tax provisions designed to give an
advantage to local activity over competing out-of-state activity evidence
discrimination, and the Court has struck such provisions down for
"discriminating]... by 'providing a direct commercial advantage to local
business. ' "1
8
Because the Commerce Clause was intended to minimize trade
distortions and economic competition between the states, 18 9 Enrich argues
that the proper test for evaluating tax incentives "should be whether a
particular tax provision distorts economic decision-making in favor of in-
state activity, not whether it treats in-state and out-of-state actors
disparately."' 0 This proposed test is a stricter standard than the criteria
184Id.
185 Id.
186 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 432-33.
187 Id. at 432.
18 8 Id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 268).
189 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 325.
190 Enrich, supra note 2, at 456.
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proposed by Hellerstein and Coenen. 191 If the Court did evaluate a tax
incentive on whether it distorted economic decision making towards the
taxing state, then the same property tax that was constitutional under
Hellerstein and Coenen's state-favoritism/state-coercion test will be struck
down. 192
Keeping the Commerce Clause values of economic union and
federalism in mind, Enrich argues that "the Court has the opportunity to
strengthen its Commerce Clause jurisprudence" by "prohibit[ing] state tax
measures that discriminate against interstate commerce by distorting the
decisions of economic actors in favor of expenditures on in-state
activities. ' 93  This prohibition would render all state tax incentives
"virtually per se unconstitutional," even those that would pass constitutional
muster under the Hellerstein and Coenen test. 194
Two points should be taken from the Court's decisions on state tax
incentives. First, the Court has not yet squarely decided the
constitutionality of tax incentives designed to attract investment to the state.
Second, the Court's decisions reflect an interest in balancing the economic
welfare of the nation with the local autonomy of the states. In recognizing
the state's interest encouraging development with autonomy, the Court
implicitly recognizes that there are valid reasons for a state to enact
incentives, a point that the prisoners' dilemma model can fall to fully
capture.
c. Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations on Non-Tax
Incentives - Case Law
While the Court has invalidated all of the state tax incentive
provisions it has had occasion to consider, non-tax incentives (subsidies)
have had a greater record of success. This has caused considerable
confusion, as the practical effect of a cash subsidy given to a business is the
same as the effect of a tax credit of the same amount.'9 5 This is of
particular note because the Court has said that "'constitutionality under the
commerce Clause ... depends upon ... practical effect' and 'economic
191 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 326.
192 See id.
193 Enrich, supra note 2, at 457-58.
194 id. at 458.
195 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 835 (noting that "[e]conomists know that
the real-world impact of such a subsidy mirrors the effect of the [tax] credit" Id. (citing
HEILBRONER & THUROW, supra note 16, at 173)).
[Vol. 33:71
PRISONERS No MORE
realities. ' " 196  While the Court has "never squarely confronted the
constitutionality of subsidies,"'197 examining its treatment of non-tax
subsidies provides insight into whether state subsidization of local activity
is permissible under the Commerce Clause.
In 1976, the Supreme Court heard the case of Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corporation,198 which dealt with Maryland's subsidy program for the
processing of abandoned automobiles. In an effort to rid their state of
abandoned automobiles, the Maryland legislature enacted a complicated
subsidy structure that penalized storage of abandoned automobiles with
fines, while rewarding the processing of these automobiles with cash
bounties. 199 Collecting the processing bounties required submission of
detailed documentation; however, the state's documentation requirements
were less stringent for in-state processors. 200 Out-of-state car processors
challenged the subsidy, arguing that it "violated the Commerce Clause by
interfering with ... the flow of bounty-eligible hulks across state lines." 201
The Court upheld the subsidy program, holding that "[niothing in
the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State ... from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens
over others. 20 2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted that the
Commerce Clause does not "inhibit a State's power to experiment with
different methods of encouraging local industry," be it with a "cash
subsidy, a tax credit, or a special privilege intended to attract investment
capital., 20 3  Such activity, Stevens wrote, "should note [sic] be
characterized as a 'burden' on commerce.",
204
Alexandria Scrap represents the Court's creation of the market-
participation exemption from the dormant Commerce Clause.
Distinguishing the Maryland auto hulk bounties from unconstitutional
provisions which "interfer[e] with the natural functioning of the interstate
market either through prohibition or through burdensome regulation," the
Court found that Maryland "ha[d] entered into the market itself to bid up
[auto hulks'] price.' 20 5 Thus, a state is exempt from dormant Commerce
196 Id. (quoting Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. 734, 750 (1978) and Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
197 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994).
198 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation, 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
199 See id. at 796-801.
200 See id.
201 Id. at 802.
202 Id. at 810.
203 Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 816 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 806.
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Clause constraints when it participates in a market, buying or selling goods,
instead of regulating it.2
06
The Court has mentioned state subsidies in a number of other
decisions that do not directly confront their constitutionality.2 7 First, in
New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach, °8 the Court discussed
Indiana's ethanol subsidy as an alternative to Ohio's ethanol tax credit.2 9
The Court did not decide the constitutionality of the Indiana subsidy;
however, it "offer[ed] its now often-cited utterance that '[d]irect
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the
Commerce Clause] prohibition."' 2 0
This point was reiterated in South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 211 and again in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown.212  South-Central Timber dealt with an Alaska provision
designed to assist the in-state timber industry. While the Court did not
decide the case on the constitutionality of the provision, Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion indicated that the subsidy should be considered valid
under the market-participant exception set forth in Alexandria Scrap.213 C
& A Carbone invalidated a state law that required use of a local waste-
processing center for all local waste. When the town argued that it was
using the only means available to support the processing center,214 the
Court disagreed, saying, "the town may subsidize the facility through
general taxes or municipal bonds. 215
The most recent state subsidy case heard by the Court was West
Lynn Creamery v. Healy.216 In response to the loss of market share
experienced by local dairy farmers, Massachusetts enacted legislation that
did two things. 21 7 First, it required every in-state dealer of milk to make a
monthly payment into the Massachusetts Dairy Equalization Fund.21 8
206 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 323-24.
207 See generally, Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 840-45 (examining the various
cases in which the Court has touched on the constitutionality of state subsidies).
208 See supra notes 158-167 and accompanying text.
209 See New Energy Co. at 278.
210 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 840 (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at
278).
211 South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
212 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
213 South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
the market-participation exception, see notes 232-239 and accompanying text.
214 See C & A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. at 394.
215 Id. at 394 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
216 West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
217 See id. at 189.
218 See id. at 190.
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Second, it distributed the proceeds of the Fund to in-state milk producers.
2 1 9
The Court invalidated the measure, recognizing that its practical effect was
to burden out-of-state producers with the entire cost of the subsidy, because
the subsidy represented a tax rebate to in-state producers.22° This functional
tax rebate was indistinguishable from the tax exemption declared
unconstitutional in Bacchus.221
However, West Lynn Creamery should not be read as an indication
that all state subsidies of local activity are unconstitutional. The Court
invalidated the Massachusetts statute on very narrow grounds, explaining
that since the subsidy was funded directly from the taxes on milk produced
out-of-state, the subsidy "not only assist[ed] local farmers, but burden[ed]
interstate commerce."2 2 While "[a] pure subsidy funded out of general
revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely
assists local business," the Massachusetts program "violate[d] the cardinal
principle that a State may not 'benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors.'
23
D. Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations on Non-Tax
Incentives -Analysis
The Court's pronouncement in West Lynn Creamery that it has
"never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies" has left many
scholars guessing as to the future of non-tax incentives.224 It has been
argued that the line of examined cases and the market-participant exception
will render state subsidies constitutional.2 Others believe that these
objections fall to undermine the Commerce Clause challenge that should be
levied against state subsidies.226
Beginning with Alexandria Scrap, and all the way through West
Lynn Creamery, the Court reiterates two themes. First, the Court has never
set forth a detailed explanation of how subsidy programs interact with the
Constitution. Second, the Court believes that "'[d]irect subsidization of
domestic industry"' is generally constitutional., 22 7 The Court's opinions in
219 See id. at 191.
220 See Enrich, supra note 2, at 431 (citing West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 194).
221 See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. 512 U.S. at 196-97.
222 Id. at 199.
223 Id. (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, at 273-74 (1988)).
224 Id. at n.15.
225 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 839-48.
226 See generally Enrich, supra note 2, at 440-48.
227 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 839 (quoting New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at
278).
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Alexandria Scrap, South-Central Timber, C & A Carbone, and New Energy
Co. all endorse state subsidies to some degree;228 however, those
endorsements usually occur in "only the briefest dicta,"229 and are applied
in a very narrow scope.23°
The market-participant exception to dormant Commerce Clause
limitations outlined in Alexandria Scrap is further evidence that subsidies
do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. While the court has not
applied the market-participant exception per se to state subsidies, the
underlying rationale supports the notion that subsidies should be exempt
from constitutional challenge.231 The market-participant exception is based
on the idea that states ought to be free to spend their resources as they see
fit when conducting business activities, such as buying and selling goods.232
The Commerce Clause does not "inhibit a State's power to experiment with
different methods of encouraging local industry, 33 nor does it "limit the
ability of the States themselves to operate in the free market.,
234
While the Court has never comprehensively examined state
subsidies, it is likely that it will not invalidate subsidies as it has repeatedly
done to state tax incentives.235 The Court has explicitly approved
"subsidization of domestic industry" repeatedly,236 has recognized the
market-participant exception to Commerce Clause limitations, and has
exempted direct payment subsidies funded from state general treasuries.23 7
The Court's treatment of state subsidies requires that a distinction
be made between tax incentives and subsidies, and suggests that state
subsidies are largely immune from the challenges that undermine tax
238incentives. The Court's indication that a state may constitutionally
develop its economy through subsidization reveals an implicit recognition
of the need for state autonomy in economic development, just as was
228 See supra notes 199-215 and accompanying text.
229 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 843.
230 See id. (commenting that the Court's approval of Maryland's auto hulk subsidy
program was based on the limited grounds of the market-participant exception, and that the
decision in Carbone was based on the grounds that the subsidy represented the "least
restrictive alternative for meeting a critical state financing need.").
231 See id. at 845.
232 Little, supra note 75, at 874.
233 Huges v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation, 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1976).
.34 See Little, supra note 75, at 874 (quoting Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1980)).
235 See id.; see also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 844; Schaefer, supra note 4,
at 324-25.
236 Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 844 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. at 278).
237 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 324 (citing New Energy Co., 486 U.S. 269 (1988)).
238 See id.
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present in the tax incentive cases. This recognition suggests that the Court
understands that a state may want to grant relocation incentives in an
attempt to maximize its attractiveness to foreign investment, not merely out
of fear of the economic decisions of neighboring states. By focusing only
on the potential welfare distortions posed by relocation incentives, the
prisoners' dilemma fails to capture the value of local autonomy in
economic development recognized by the Supreme Court.
2. Relocation Incentives in Canada
There is no equivalent of the dormant Commerce Clause in the
Canadian Constitution. 39 To this date, the Canadian Supreme Court has
not interpreted the federal trade and commerce power broadly enough to
permit federal legislation over interprovincial trade matters such as
relocation incentives. 24°  As a result, the provinces retain significant
amounts of authority over inter-provincial trade.24' In response to the
recent push to eliminate interprovincial trade barriers, the Agreement on
Internal Trade was signed in 1994 by the provinces242 and designed to
reduce and eliminate barriers to the free exchange of goods, services, labor,
and investment within Canada.243
The Agreement on Internal Trade provides four central principles
for its implementation. First, provinces will not establish new barriers to
trade within Canada. Second, provinces will give equal treatment to all
Canadian persons, goods, services, and investments. Third, the provinces
will modify regulations as necessary to allow free trade within Canada.
Finally, the provinces will ensure that provincial policies provide for free
trade within Canada.244 These principles guide the application of its
provisions.
The Agreement's general rules are laid out in Chapter Four, and
they apply to the Agreement as a whole unless otherwise excepted. Article
401, which is entitled "Reciprocal Non-Discrimination," requires the
provinces to provide the goods, services, persons, and investments of other
239 See Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between Free
Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 441,
462 (1997).
240 See id. at 461.
241 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 332.
242 See Schaefer, supra note 240, at 462.
243 See Michael J. Trebilcock & Rambod Behboodi, The Canadian Agreement on Internal
Trade: Retrospect and Prospects, in GETrnNG THERE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
ON INTERNAL TRADE 20, 39-40 (Michael J. Trebilcock & Daniel Schwanen, eds., 1995).
244 Agreement on Internal Trade, July 18, 1994, art. 102(3), Can.
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provinces "treatment no less favourable than the best treatment it accords"
to those items originating within its borders.245 This sentiment is echoed in
article 402, which forbids any province from "adopt[ing] or maintain[ing]
any measure that restricts or prevents the movement of persons, goods,
services or investments across provincial boundaries.
246
While these provisions seem stem in their prohibition of internal
trade barriers, the Agreement has extensive exception provisions. Article
404 provides that any measure that is inconsistent with articles 401 or 402
may be permissible if: 1) the measure is designed to achieve a legitimate
objective; 2) the measure does not unduly impair the access of persons,
goods, services or investments of another province that meet the objective;
3) the measure is the least restrictive means of obtaining the objective; and
4) the measure does not disguise the restriction of trade.247 Article 404
demonstrates that in drafting the Agreement, the provinces retained for
themselves the freedom to adopt policy measures that harm interprovincial
trade, provided a legitimate objective can be shown.248
The same tension can be seen in the Agreement's provisions
addressing investment. Chapter Six, which covers investment, is explicitly
exempt from the general rules of articles 401, 402, 403, and 404.249 Article
603 provides that each province must provide to an investor or an enterprise
of another province "treatment no less favourable than the best treatment it
accords" to investors and enterprises from within its own borders °50 This
non-discrimination principle is applied specifically to incentives in article
607, which provides that a province may not condition an investor or
enterprise's receipt of an incentive on purchasing or using local goods or
services. 25'
However, just as in Chapter Four, Chapter Seven carves out
specific exceptions that allow incentives inconsistent with the provisions
stated above. Article 607, Paragraph 2 provides that a province will be
permitted to condition the receipt of an incentive on carrying out economic
activities or creating employment within the province. Paragraph 3
permits the creation of incentives for "regional economic development
purposes," as long as the measure is the least restrictive means possible to
meet the objective, and as long as other provinces are given adequate
245 Id. art. 401.
246 Id. art. 402.
247 See id. art. 404.
248 See Trebilcock & Behboodi, supra note 243, at 43-44.
249 See Agreement on Internal Trade, art. 600(1).
250 Id. art. 602.
251 See id. art. 606(t).
252 See id. art. 606(2).
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notice. 53  Finally, article 4 of Annex 607.3 (Code of Conduct on
Incentives) recognizes that relocation incentives may potentially harm the
economic interests of other provinces, and instructs that the provinces are to
consider the economic interests of other provinces when developing their
incentive policies.2 4 The provinces must "endeavour" to refrain from
granting incentives that sustain economically infeasible operations for an
extended period of time, create unwarranted increase in any market sectors,
or are excessive in value.25
Just as Chapter Four, which provided the general rules for the
Agreement, Chapter Six reveals the provinces' lack of commitment to
drafting an effective prohibition on internal trade barriers. The Chapter
boldly prohibits discriminatory incentives in article 602, yet just as quickly
provides a comprehensive list of exceptions for provinces to employ. The
exceptions do have limitations, but they are flimsy. For instance, an
incentive is permissible as long as it is "not more trade restrictive than
necessary to achieve its specific objective.' ' 56 In abiding by the provisions
of Annex 608.3, aorovince must merely "endeavour" not to enact
forbidden incentives. These terms are largely subjective, and difficult if
not impossible to enforce.
It may be too early to measure the effectiveness of the 1994
Agreement on Internal Trade; however, it seems unlikely that it will
succeed in removing the Canadian provinces from the prisoners' dilemma
they face.2 8 Since the Agreement leaves the determination of whether
incentives are appropriate and permissible in the hands of individual
provinces, no province can be sure that others will not enact incentives.
The provinces are left with no choice but to grant incentives of their own,
lest they risk being damaged by other provincial incentives.
IV. A NEW MODEL: WHY THE STATES MAY NOT
BE TRAPPED IN THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA
A. The Callfor a Federal Legislative Solution
In an effort to save the states from the prisoners' dilemma, many
commentators have called for federal legislation to halt the further
253 Id. art. 606(3).
254 See Agreement on Internal Trade, Annex 607.3, art. 4.
255 See id.; see also Trebilcock & Behboodi, supra note 243, at 54.
256 Agreement on Internal Trade, art. 606(3)(b).
257 Id. Annex 607.3, art. 4.
258 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 334.
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enactment of state investment relocation incentives. 259 The uncertain level
of success the U.S. has had with Commerce Clause restraints, and Canada's
mixed opinions on the Internal Trade Agreement has led some to the
conclusion that federal intervention is necessary. 260 The argument for
federal restraints is based on the notion that the federal government has a
greater ability to enforce restraints against incentives than local
governments, thus relieving them from the prisoners' dilemma.26'
It has been argued that the federal government would enforce a ban
on incentives more effectively than state governments. Federal legislation
would not require unanimous consent of every state to be enacted, as would
a binding agreement among states.262 Federal legislation would be enforced
by federal courts, which are not subject to the political pressures and
distortions to which state courts are vulnerable. 263 Finally, while legislation
holding states accountable for misguided incentives is becoming
increasingly popular, there is no guarantee that states will accurately
measure economic externalities that incentives are designed to
counteract.264 With these advantages in mind, commentators believe that
federal legislation is necessary to remove the states from the prisoners'
dilemma.
B. The Weakness of the Prisoners' Dilemma
The prisoners' dilemma has been used extensively to describe the
situation faced by the states when enacting relocation incentives.266 As
discussed above in Section IIIC, the prisoners' dilemma suggests that even
though states are best off when no incentives are enacted, states enact
relocation incentives because they cannot be sure that their neighbors will
259 See generally Taylor, supra note 10, at 694-708 (describing the inadequacies of
contract theory and suggesting federal-level models); Schaefer, supra note 4, at 335-41;
Little, supra note 75, at 877-80.
260 See generally Taylor, supra note 10, at 694-708 (discussing possible federal models
and the strengths of these models); Schaefer, supra note 4, at 335-41.
261 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 696; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 336.
262 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 336.
263 See Taylor, supra note 10, at 695.
264 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 336-37.
265 See id. at 335-36.
266 See generally Schaefer, supra note 4, at 335-41; Enrich, supra note 2, at 396-97;
Little, supra note 75, at 858-59; Taylor, supra note 10, at 693-94 (recognizing the need for
cooperation between the states to cease offering relocation incentives).
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not.267 However, careful examination of the model's structure shows that it
does not tell the full story.
The prisoners' dilemma is a model that attempts to explain
decisions parties make based on certain known consequences for those
decisions. The results the model predicts are entirely dependent upon the
way in which the model is set up. In other words, the person who sets up
the model can drastically affect the outcome predicted depending on the
sentences imposed for the prisoners' different choices.
Below is the diagram of the prisoners' dilemma as set up by
Professor Schaefer:
Outcome is (P's P1 doesn't confess P1 confesses
sentence, P2 's
sentence)
P2 doesn't confess (0 years, 0 years) (1 year, 10 years)
P2 confesses (10 years, 1 years) (5 years, 5 years)
As described above, the prisoner chooses to confess because he is
afraid of the ten-year sentence that will be imposed if his companion
confesses but he does not.268 However, if the model assumes different
consequence valuations, the outcome will be different. For example, if the
model is changed by changing the ten-year penalty sentence for not
confessing to a five-year maximum sentence, the prisoner will make a
different choice. Consider the following diagram:
Outcome is (Pl's P1 doesn't confess P1 confesses
sentence, P2's
sentence)
P2 doesn't confess (0 years, 0 years) (1 year, 5 years)
P2 confesses (5 years, 1 years) (5 years, 5 years)
In this situation, a prisoner who does not confess is no worse off
than one who does. The prisoner who confesses will receive one year if the
other remains silent, and will receive a sentence of five years if the other
confesses. A prisoner who remains silent will go free if the other remains
silent, and five years if the other confesses. With these sentencing
parameters, there is no fear of incurring a heavy sentence for not
confessing, and thus no reason for a prisoner to confess.
The literature on state relocation incentives and the prisoners'
dilemma fails to address the malleable nature of the model. While the
model articulated by Schaefer and used by others succeeds in explaining
267 See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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why a state that does not want to grant relocation incentives might feel
compelled to do so, it does not examine the circumstances under which a
state may find granting incentives desirable.
In order to understand the reasons why a state may believe granting
incentives is beneficial, one should turn to the prisoners' dilemma model
often used by economists. Consider the following description of the model:
Two criminals have been caught by the police. Because of the lack of
evidence, the prosecution needs a confession to convict. If no confession
ensues, they will be charged and convicted for a minor offense earning
them one year less than a conviction for the main crime.
The prosecutor offers each prisoner the following deal. If she confesses,
and the other does not, she will get three years off her sentence whereas
the other prisoner will get an extra year in prison. If both confess, they
will be punished according to the law (no reductions).269
Eichberger's model is diagramed as follows:
Outcome is (P1's P1 doesn't confess P1 confesses
sentence, P2's
sentence')
P2 doesn't confess (main crime minus 1 (main crime minus 3
year, main crime years, main crime plus
minus 1 year) 1 year)
P2 confesses (main crime plus 1 (main crime, main
year, main crime crime)
minus 3 years)
At first glance, Eichberger's sentences may appear to offer no
additional insight into the model. It is true that just as under Schaefer's
penalty structure, the prisoners both confess, leaving them with an outcome
other than their ideal. However, there is an important distinction to be
made.
In Schaefer's model, the best outcome a prisoner can hope for is
zero years in prison, which occurs when both prisoners remain silent.
Compare this to Eichberger's economic game theory model, in which a
prisoner's ideal outcome is having three years removed from his sentence.
This outcome occurs if he confesses and his cohort remains silent. One may
wonder what difference this makes. After all, both models predict that the
prisoners will both confess, thus leaving them with unwanted outcomes.
269 JURGEN EICHBERGER, GAME THEORY FOR EcONOMisTs 65 (1993); see also MARTIN J.
OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY, 16-17 (1994) (articulating a
model of the prisoners' dilemma which imposes the same sentence values as Eichberger's
model).
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The difference between the models lies not in the outcomes, but in the
motivations the prisoners have for the choices they make.
In Schaefer's model, the prisoners' desired outcome is zero years in
prison, which they can only reach if they both remain silent. However, they
have no way of knowing if the other has remained silent or has confessed.
Because the prisoner fears the ten-year sentence he will be handed if he
remains silent and the other has confessed, he chooses to confess. This is
crucial, and bears repeating. Each prisoner gives up hope of achieving his
preferred outcome because he is afraid of what the other might do. Thus,
the prisoner's choice is made with a defensive posture; that is, he is trying
to protect himself.
Under Eichberger's economic game theory model, the prisoners
have different motivations for making their choices. With the sentences
used in Eichberger's model, the prisoner's preferred outcome is three years
less than a conviction for the major crime imposes. The prisoner will
receive this sentence if he confesses and the other prisoner remains silent.
The prisoner confesses because it is necessary for him to do so to reach his
ultimate goal. He confesses not in a defensive posture, and not out of fear
as in Schaefer's model, but in an aggressive move designed to attain his
desired outcome.
The motivations of the prisoners in both models can be contrasted
in another way. In Schaefer's model, the prisoner makes the choice to
confess, as illustrated by the following imagined inner monologue: "I am
best off if we both remain silent. I can't be sure that the other prisoner will
remain silent, and I do not want to risk going to prison for ten years, so I am
going to confess. Even though I'm giving up on my preferred outcome, I
will be better off than if the other prisoner confesses and I remain silent."
This reasoning is entirely defensive in nature, as becomes even clearer
when contrasted with Eichberger's prisoner's thoughts: "I am best off if I
confess and the other prisoner does not. I am going to confess to give
myself the best chance I can to reach my desired outcome. I cannot control
the other prisoner's choice, but I will do what I can to advance my
interests."
It may seem that this is an intellectual exercise without much
meaning. After all, under both models, the prisoners both confess, and both
receive larger sentences than they would have received had they both
remained silent. The crucial distinction is the divergence of interest and
choice in Schaefer's model, contrasted with the convergence of interest and
choice in Eichberger's. In Schaefer's model, each prisoner chooses to
confess, even when it is in his best interest to remain silent. However, in
Eichberger's model, the prisoner is acting in furtherance of his interests
when he confesses. This may be of little consequence for the prisoners,
who have to serve jail time in both models. The distinction has
considerable value, however, when applied to the study of state investment
relocation incentives.
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Both models presume that the prisoners make their decisions
simultaneously, or at least that the sentences are imposed simultaneously.
This means that timing is not a concern to the prisoners. A prisoner does
not benefit from acting first. If one prisoner chooses to confess, his
sentence is not imposed until the other prisoner makes his decision. This is
not the case with states. If a state chooses to grant an incentive before any
of its neighbors, it is likely to gain a timing advantage over those neighbors.
Even if a neighboring state decides to match the incentive with one of their
own, the timing advantage gained by the state that acts first may preserve
the incentive's benefits.
This point illustrates the inaccuracy of Schaefer's model in
analyzing the motivations states have when enacting relocation incentives.
As was discussed earlier, in Schaefer's model, states enact incentives out of
an underlying fear that they will be penalized if they do not. They enact
incentives defensively, to protect themselves against the incentives other
states might enact. I do not believe that this model portrays state goals as
accurately as Eichberger's model.
Eichberger's model describes the states' actions as aggressive
attempts to maximize their advantage over their neighbors in attracting
outside investment. The states make incentive decisions in a context of
economic factors that are constantly shifting. Enacting an incentive may be
the factor that gives a state the necessary advantage over its neighbors to
attract investment. This is the hope of many states when they enact
relocation incentives.
Of course, Schaefer's model is not to be discounted entirely. Once
a few states begin to enact incentives, the others will certainly respond in
order to protect their interests. However, their responses are likely to be
attempts to gain an economic advantage of their own, not attempts to
merely neutralize the advantage of their neighbors. Schaefer's model
characterizes all relocation incentives as measures that states would not
enact but for the prisoners' dilemma in which they are trapped. I believe
that this is overstated. While Schaefer is almost certainly correct that states
often feel pressure to grant incentives to keep pace with other states, he fails
to consider the possibility that states may be using incentives as a genuine
attempt to make their state more desirable to outside investment.
The fact that the prisoners' dilemma can be manipulated in this
manner shows the weakness of much of the literature on state investment
relocation incentives. However, it also shows that there may be multiple
reasons for state actions. The analysis of commentators who use a model
similar to Schaefer's is certainly correct. States must be concerned with the
actions of their neighbors. They cannot simply stand by idly and hope that
no other state makes aggressive moves to attract industry. They must act
out of fear for their economic self-interest, and they must act defensively.
This defensive posture is only half the story. A state may enact incentives
in an aggressive move to gain an economic advantage over neighboring
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states. Both of these postures, defensive and offensive, must be considered
when evaluating the reasons for a state's incentives.
The analysis may ultimately turn on the way in which the state
itself views the costs of choosing to grant or not grant incentives. If we
return to the prisoners for a moment, this becomes clear. In Schaefer's
model, the prisoners choose to confess to protect themselves against what
the other prisoner might do, whereas in Eichberger's model, the prisoners
choose to confess in order to reach their preferred outcome. The states face
a similar situation. If a state feels that it would be best off by not enacting
incentives, but does so out of a protectionist impulse, it does indeed fit into
Schaefer's model, and can aptly be described as trapped in the prisoners'
dilemma. On the other hand, if a state feels that it would be best off by
gaining an advantage over its neighbors with incentives, then Schaefer's
model does not apply. This state would fit better into Eichberger's model,
which indicates that the state is not trapped, but using the tools that it has at
its disposal to maximize its return.
It may, in fact, be impossible to assign a meaningful value to the
costs associated with (or sentences imposed by) the choices a state has.
While the actual number of tax dollars that an incentive will cost a state can
be determined, there are other intangible factors that a state must consider.
Among these are the costs of other investment attraction improvements
(e.g., worker training, education, infrastructure improvements), the
potential for growth of secondary businesses, which would spring up
around new industry, and the likelihood that industry may choose their state
without incentives.
These costs are likely to be immeasurable. However, they do not
need to be measured to demonstrate that states are likely to have different
views of relocation incentives depending on their economic and social
situation. Accordingly, they will have different views of the prisoners'
dilemma. Some may feel trapped in incentive wars, whereas others may
feel that they are benefiting from them. In any case, it is inappropriate to
evaluate a state's view of the prisoners' dilemma without giving careful
thought to how the state views its choices and the costs associated with
them. That evaluation is critical in determining how to characterize a
state's decision.
V. CONCLUSION
The economic community has not come to a settled conclusion on
the matter of investment relocation incentives. However, there is an
increasingly strong tide of disfavor towards them. The bulk of the
empirical data suggests that incentives have at best little effect, and have
the potential for damaging economic distortions. Thus, the states may be
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engaging in a pattern of granting incentives that is ultimately damaging to
their economic well being.
Nevertheless, there is real value in allowing states to make
autonomous decisions regarding their economic development. State
decisions affect neighboring states and the nation as a whole, and must
therefore be monitored. Both the Dormant Commerce Clause decisions
discussed and the Canadian Internal Trade Agreement provide necessary
mechanisms for oversight. On the other hand, both the Supreme Court and
the Canadian ITA recognize that federalism values local autonomy in
economic decision making. When used effectively, the prisoners' dilemma
can reflect this tension between beneficial and harmful consequences in
state relocation incentives. However, when used ineffectively, the
prisoners' dilemma only reflects the harmful consequences, thus portraying
the states as locked in a downward spiral of ever-increasing tax credits.
It is true that states may face harmful consequences from granting
(or refusing to grant) incentives. One must not make the mistake of
extrapolating state motives from the consequences they face. A state may
grant an incentive because it fears what other states may do. A state may
also grant an incentive because it genuinely hopes that investment will
relocate within their territory. The state's decision is a product of how it
weighs the costs of each option. The prisoners' dilemma is a useful tool in
framing the problem the states face, but it is not a comprehensive analysis
of that problem. The model must be made flexible to fully reflect the
different views a state may have of the costs of granting or not granting
relocation incentives.
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